This interview is also available on podcast platforms and Rumble.
Any technology created by the US military industrial complex and adopted by the general public was always bound to come with a caveat. To most, the internet, GPS, touch screen and other ubiquitous technologies are ordinary tools of the modern world. Yet in reality, these technologies serve “dual-uses”; while they convenience typical people, they also enable the mass coercion, surveillance and control of those very same people at the hands of the corporate and military state.
Nolan Higdon and Allison Butler, authors of “Surveillance Education: Navigating the Conspicuous Absence of Privacy in Schools,” join host Chris Hedges on this episode of The Chris Hedges Report. They explore the software and technology systems employed in K-12 schools and higher education institutions that surveil students, erode minors’ privacy rights and, in the process, discriminate against students of color.
The use of this technology, Higdon explains, is predicated on treating humans as products through surveillance capitalism. “You extract data and information about humans from all these smart technologies, and then you're able to make determinations about their behavior, how they might react to something. And there's a lot of industries that are interested in this,” Higdon tells Hedges.
Butler explains that students, often with no choice in the matter, are subjected to the use of this technology that inherently exploits their data. Because there is an implied consent for it to be used, “The very limited amount of protections that there are to keep minors’ data secure is gone once you have a technology that is put into their classroom,” Butler says. “There's a passive acceptance of this technology.”
Higdon points to changes made by the Obama administration in 2012 to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) as a key factor. These changes allowed for student data to be shared with private companies that serve as educational partners. “Effectively, all of that data that the students rights movement worked to make sure was private was allowed to be distributed to these companies,” Higdon says.
The authors stress the deep impact these technologies have on the fundamental processes of learning in the classroom. “It curtails curiosity, which is essential to the education process,” Higdon says. “The mental trauma and difficulty of closing one of the few spaces where they're able to explore, I think it just speaks to the problem with surveillance and the education process.”
Host:
Chris Hedges
Producer:
Max Jones
Intro:
Diego Ramos
Crew:
Diego Ramos, Sofia Menemenlis and Thomas Hedges
Transcript:
Diego Ramos
Transcript
Chris Hedges
Surveillance tools have become ubiquitous in schools and universities. Technologies, promising greater safety and enhanced academic performance, have allowed Gaggle, Securly, Bark, and others to collect detailed data on students. These technologies, however, have not only failed to deliver on their promises, but have eviscerated student privacy. This is especially true in poor communities, where there is little check on wholesale surveillance. This data is often turned against students, especially the poor and students of color, accelerating the school-to-prison pipeline. When students and teachers know they are being watched and monitored it stifles intellectual debate, any challenging of the dominant narrative and inquiry into abuses of power. But more ominously, it allows corporations and government agencies to stigmatize and criminalize students. These digital platforms can target the young with propaganda, and use social engineering and trend analysis to shape behavior. Joining me to discuss the mass surveillance of students is Nolan Higdon, author, with Allison Butler, of “Surveillance Education: Navigating the Conspicuous Absence of Privacy in Schools.”
So Allison, let's begin with you, and as you do in the book, give us a portrait of how intrusive—which I didn't know until I read your book—how intrusive this surveillance is and how it works.
Allison Butler
Sure. Thank you so much for having us. I would say that the shortest answer to that question is it's incredibly, wholly, fully intrusive. And to expand on that we live in a world right now of surveillance technologies. There's pretty much no place you and I can go as individuals where we aren't in some capacity being surveilled. Much of that is, to a certain degree, by our own choice. For example, if we get into our car and use our GPS, we are agreeing to those terms. What our concern is, in particular with this text, is that we have an overwhelming amount of surveillance in our K through 12 and higher education schools. Specifically for K through 12 schools, that surveillance is happening for minors, for children under the age of 18, without their active consent. We have kind of been accustomed, we've been sort of groomed for surveillance technologies by some of those soft technologies, such as our GPS, such as QR codes that help us make looking at restaurant menus a little bit easier, such as some of the apps on our phone that make our lives feel a bit more convenient. The cost of that is that when harder and more intrusive surveillance technologies come into our worlds, and for our concern in particular, come into our classrooms, we've kind of already had the foundation laid where we're primed for that, and we might not necessarily question those technologies to the extent that they deserve.
Chris Hedges
Well, those technologies, as you point out in the book, are not marketed as surveillance systems. They're marketed as enhancements to education, enhancements to security. And just give me a picture of some of those which embark and these other digital surveillance tools, give me a picture of what they are and how they work.
Nolan Higdon
Yeah. Thank you so much for having me, Chris. Allison and I are happy to be here. And I think the easiest way to understand it is, much like the rest of Silicon Valley, these education technology or ed tech companies, they tend to over promise and under deliver. So a lot of the justifications for adding them to classrooms are things people would typically agree with, right? These tools are going to make us more secure or safe. They're going to improve learning. They're going to prepare students for the 21st century market. Some of them even advertise themselves as being more inclusive. That is more DEI compliant, because they take out the human bias, or human element, is what they claim. But we notice in all these cases, they really mask more, I would argue, pernicious motives. There's a lot of money to be made by having these tools in the classroom and being able to collect data. So that's one issue. The other issue is, in addition to masking the real motive, which is making profit, they don't really deliver on a lot of these promises. We talk about in the book, how, even though they say that these tools are built to promote safety, they often fall short in that. There's a dearth of evidence to say that they actually improve learning and then there's a lot of good evidence that they're actually work against the goals of DEI. So in a lot of these cases, it seems like the reasons that are given for having these ed tech tools in schools is very different than what they actually do or the real purpose by adding them to a school.
Chris Hedges
Allison, can you explain specifically, like, for instance, Bark or pick one or two of these programs and explain to us what they, of course they're collecting data, but what do they do within the school setting? What is their function?
Allison Butler
Sure. So one example that's used in a lot of K through 12 classrooms is a technology called GoGuardian. GoGuardian is put onto computers, classroom laptops. So if you have, for argument's sake, a classroom where every student has assigned a laptop, it could be their own assignation that they have that particular one for the entire school year or it could be classroom laptops, and it just happens to be where the student is sitting. GoGuardian monitors their screens, it monitors all of what they're doing, and then the teacher at the front of the classroom, or wherever they happen to be, can be looking at the student screens during class. One argument that GoGuardian says is that this helps teachers keep students on track, and therefore helps students stay on track. So it's presented as behavioral. It's presented as sort of a tool of focus, because teachers can be looking at student screens, and then there's a kind of a carrot and a stick element to it, which is a teacher can say, hey, you need to get off that website. That's not what we're working on. Or can look directly at a student's work and comment about what they're doing well or what might need to be adapted. It's presented as this sort of community technology for classrooms. Here's what some of the problems we find with GoGuardian: Teachers are often told that it's theirs to be reviewing and in fact, many of the teachers that we interviewed for the book said that they believed that they were the ones doing the surveillance, that they were a little bit uncomfortable with that, but they really saw the power of surveillance in their computers. What they aren't being told or isn't being made clear is that it's actually the corporation that's doing all the surveillance. And if we're thinking particularly of K through 12 classrooms, as I noted before, this is minors' data. So the very limited amount of protections that there are, digital protections, to keep minors data secure is gone once you have a technology that is put into their classroom, there's a passive acceptance of this technology. The students themselves didn't give an active acceptance of having their data gathered. It's an implied consent. And in fact, that's the language that's often used, is by using the technology, it's implied consent, and there isn't necessarily an opt out. So we have a classroom of confusion where the teacher believes that they're in charge and that they're making a particular ethical decision, when in fact, they're not the ones in charge. Once something like GoGuardian grabs student data and grabs their information, it has it, there is no kind of off switch to this, and if at a time that a student maybe plugs in their personal cell phone into that device to charge it, GoGuardian now has all of that data as well because of the digital connection of these devices. One teacher that we interviewed got a little uncomfortable, was telling a story where they were a bit uncomfortable with GoGuardian, in part because the student was home sick and the teacher could still see what was happening on the screen, like even when the student was home, out of school for a legit reason, the teacher could see the student like watching YouTube videos. And that was when she kind of thought, Oh, this isn't what I thought it was. This isn't directly connected to the classroom, right? I think sometimes the conveniences of our digital technologies invite us to forget that our digital technologies can be monitored everywhere we are, not just in our classrooms. I think another example, something that's used both in K 12 and higher education, would be Turnitin. Turnitin is a program where teachers can set it up so that students submit their written work via this platform, and it sells itself, it presents itself as plagiarism detection, which I suppose, on some level, is true. This is the other insidious thing is that a lot of these technologies and these corporations don't ever actually lie to you. They just kind of don't tell you the whole truth, and they leave out some really important parts. So Turnitin, yes, is a plagiarism detection software. And also, Turnitin does at least two things. One, it's teaching AI, right? So the students who are submitting their papers are giving more and more information to the development of generative AI, and then Turnitin also sells that information to advertisers and marketers, so that young people's language is being analyzed and then sort of used in advertising and marketing language and kind of sold back to them. So our young people are, to some extent, working for this corporation. They are doing a lot of the labor, and they aren't being compensated in any way. So I'd say those are sort of two really big examples that show kind of both how insidious these technologies are, how invasive they are, and how confusing they can be for those who are encouraged to use them.
Chris Hedges
Nolan, let's talk about how these technologies are used to police students, especially in poor neighborhoods, which disproportionately affects students of color.
Nolan Higdon
Yeah, one of the things we notice with these tools is that they, again, make these huge promises, right? So they promise things like we're able to predict if a students can engage in criminality, or we're able to predict if a student is having mental health issues that need to be addressed. But the devil is in the details. What these tools do is they collect a lot of data, and they code algorithms to analyze that data, to make determinations about someone's mental health or potential criminality. And this is really where we see a huge problem with over relying on these tools. These algorithms that are interpreting the data, they're coded with the same bias of their creators, and we see over and over again, how these algorithms make racist or transphobic conclusions, and what I mean by that is these algorithms will disproportionately categorize students of color as being more likely to commit a crime. As a result, they get monitored more by the school, and this again, normalizes this monitoring of Black bodies. Ditto with the mental health detectors, they disproportionately categorize things like trans kids for mental health issues, which doesn't mean they're just going through mental health challenges, which is a part of life for some folks, but also means that they need to be watched for things like school shootings or suicide or self harm. And so you get the over policing of these individuals as well. And so one of the myths, I think, that Silicon Valley in general, has sold but these ed tech tools in particular, is that they have these objective algorithms that are free of the bias of humans, and thus can can draw more accurate conclusions. But the research says no, that's not the case, if anything, these tools actually complicate or make worse a lot of the problems we've had with issues such as racism or transphobia.
Chris Hedges
Allison, I want to talk about how this data, first of all, ends up in the hands of potential employers. It's a multi-billion dollar a year industry selling our personal data, everything we've ever done, every traffic violation we've ever had, because it essentially allows employers, perhaps even universities, who are looking at high school kids, to have information that that should be private, and, of course, could be used against those students or potential employee.
Allison Butler
So I would kind of quibble with one word that you said, which is the selling of our data. I think the thing that we might need to pay more attention to, right, to Nolan's point about the devil being in the details, and to kind of what I said earlier about how they don't actually lie to us, they just don't necessarily tell us everything. So many of these technologies today will say we don't sell your data, and it's sort of a lot of exclamation points, right? And that's something that we're supposed to be like, Oh, okay, good. My data is safe. Absolutely not. First of all, your data is not safe, because breaches happen so often that it's not even headline or not even news anymore. At one point in our research, we were trying to kind of categorize or catalog all the different breaches, and we just kind of were like, pointing this out in these microdetails isn't going to be helpful, because these happen all the time. We're just so used to it. But what we really need to consider is that so many of these corporations share our data, right? So what happens is we have what you and I might think of as different corporations that don't have a connection to each other, and they've partnered. They've purchased into each other's business models. They're connected in some capacity. Then they call themselves educational corporations or educational partners. That means they don't actually have to sell our data. They can share our data. So we can be reassured on some level. But in fact, it's this other level that we might need to be thinking more carefully about. So when we're talking about employers, or when we're talking about colleges, or even maybe if we're talking about private schools, is we have so many educational partners that already have access to the data, that can already do some analysis of it, that they are allowed to share it. I think we used to talk several years ago about, particularly with K through 12 students, employers are going to look at your social media. College admissions offices are going to look at your social media. We actually don't really need to direct our young people to be concerned about these particular lanes anymore. These folks don't have to do a ton of detective work. It's already there for them. So whether they're paying close attention to it or not, I'm not exactly sure, but the data is already there. It's simply right in front of them.
Chris Hedges
Nolan, can you talk about how they're proactive, social engineering, how it's not just collecting data, but it's using data to shape and mold behavior.
Nolan Higdon
Yeah, and to add a layer to that, to pick up where Allison left off as well. And I've even said this a lot today too, these are ed tech companies, but that's kind of misleading. A lot of these companies that run or own these ed tech platforms, like we talked about a couple, like Gaggle, Bark, there's Canvas, others, they're generally owned by equity firms. This really started over the last 10 years, these equity firms bought up these ed tech tools, ostensibly because there was a way to get in the classroom. There's a whole industry here in the scholarly world they call surveillance capitalism, that is predicated on the idea of treating humans like products. So you extract data and information about humans from all these smart technologies, and then you're able to make determinations about their behavior, how might they react to something. And there's a lot of industries that are interested in this, right? Advertising industries would like to know how to create the perfect advertisement to get you to make a purchase of something. Insurance companies would like to know how to set your premiums, maybe based on health or your driving patterns, etc. So data can be quite lucrative to industries for that. But in addition to predicting behavior, there's also entities that are interested in nudging your behavior. So what can I do? What situation can I put you in? What information can I give you so you'll behave like this? And there's a big belief in the industry if we collect enough data, we can nudge people's behavior in the right direction, particularly here we are in an election year, a lot of campaigns, that's what they're trying to do with this data. How can we use this data to get these people out to vote, or get maybe these people not to vote, depending on things like that? So there's a lot of potential in the industry if you're able to collect multiple data points, and that's why schools are so attractive, right? They're one of the few places that have been protected as a public space, and so private companies have long wanted to get in there, and under the altruism of giving ed tech tools, this has been an opportunity for them to get in the classroom and get access to that, that lucrative data. And just to make a fine point on that, some of these like big firms don't just own ed tech tools, they own things like Baby Connect, which tells parents to use these tools to monitor their baby. They also own platforms that look at people's work patterns after graduation. Also get data from social media schooling. The goal is to make a what they call psychographic profile of individuals from the cradle to the grave, and schools are an important part of that process.
Chris Hedges
And I want to be clear, you point this out in the book, this is a massive industry. EdTech, you say, is $123.4 billion global industry. We're talking about big, big money. Allison, I want to talk about, we've watched over the summer as universities and schools have imposed all sorts of new restrictions and rules to shut down protests against the genocide in Palestine, and it's been coordinated across the country, no flyering, no events, tables, no encampments, et cetera. To what extent do tools like these aid universities and schools in shutting down dissent or controversy, particularly around Palestine?
Allison Butler
I think to a great extent, and I think this is a place where it's indicative of our universities' larger fears of, well, probably to be a little bit flippant, our fears of young people and what they're doing with their own technologies, but fears of the state of academic freedom, fears of what dissent means, of what disobedience means. I think we spend so much time in our classrooms praising historical acts of dissent, historical acts of disobedience but when it's confronted with us in the present tense, it is somehow terrifying. If I'm going to give them the benefit of the doubt, it is administrators looking for some way to keep their campuses safe, to keep students, faculty, staff who have differing and conflicting views safe. Unfortunately, I think the word safe is often used as a please don't sue me, right? It's a euphemism for please don't sue me. So I think out of a cultivated sense of fear that the surveillance technologies do a really good job capitalizing on fear, right? I mean to shift it a little bit, when we think about the start of COVID, it was capitalizing on the fear of what we meant to be together, right? How dangerous it could be for us to be in the same space. And I think these corporations continue to capitalize on that fear when we're looking at dissent and demonstration and disobedience. And so you have university tools, then you have police state tools, right? That police are coming in with body cameras, which, let's be honest, can be turned on and turned off to create and frame a very particular narrative, right? This is the thing, surveillance technologies and these tools cut in all directions. We have our students themselves who are filming their actions, which means there are their faces, right? If they are there in peaceful dissent, if they are there in civil disobedience, their faces are very much there, which means, if something goes wrong, no matter by whom it goes wrong, right? If it's the police instigation or opposing students instigation, we already have all of their information. So we are living in an environment where I think it is, as through history, important to be present, important to stand up, and also that presence and that standing up is being manipulated and maneuvered in terrible ways by these surveillance technologies.
Chris Hedges
And, Allison, it has a global ramification, because universities and schools traditionally are places where the exchange of ideas and dissent, in a functioning democracy, it's one of the epicenters, one of the physical epicenters where those kinds of discussions should be allowed to take place.
Allison Butler
Absolutely and I think, again, when we look at history, when we're looking at the arc of history, we somehow have this picture painted that this was dissent where people were behaving as like they had a civil disagreement, and we just don't seem to be having that anymore. So our very uncivil disagreements, our very physical disagreements are being painted and presented in a way through these technologies that we probably couldn't have done in history, right? I think a lot of talk this summer, when approaching the the presidential conventions, both the RNC and the DNC were saying, the DNC in particular, being in Chicago, of like, let's look back at history. And I think that that's important. I would never say that we shouldn't do that, but so much has been shifted in the way our technology is participating in these conventions or these dissents that our understanding of behavior is totally and utterly different.
Chris Hedges
Nolan, this information as you write in the book, doesn't just end up in the hands of corporations, it ends up in the hands of DHS, the FBI. Talk a little bit about how state security also uses this information.
Nolan Higdon
Yeah, the so-called national security, or national security industry, is heavily involved with the collection of this data. And it's worth reminding folks that these tools—internet, touch screen, GPS, and so many more of the functions of smart devices in the digital age—they come from the military industrial complex. These were created through defense funding, working in collaboration with universities and schools in the middle of the 20th century. And in fact, we talked about in the book, when students found out what these tools were being created to do, they protested against them. But to this very day, these tools continue to collect data that is shared with DHS and the intelligence community, again, under the auspices of spotting potential terrorists, spotting potential threats. But, this is problematic on numerous reasons, but one of them, just from a purely education standpoint, it really negatively impacts learning. We're telling students effectively when they're on campus, they're objects to be monitored and to be protected, against and managed. It's very difficult to develop a trusting relationship where people feel comfortable taking risks and making mistakes, which are central to education when it's an environment where they're always being policed.
Chris Hedges
Well not only policed and monitored, but as we're watching with the student protests, these monitoring tools, effectively, it's more than surveillance. It's about shutting down because they know who's involved, instantly. I mean, they knew that back in Occupy. I know because I spent a lot of time in Zuccotti, and after Bloomberg shut the park down, there were a series of police raids on lofts and they got all the right people, because they were monitoring them electronically. Allison, I want you to talk about, in particular, two cyber security tools. I want you to talk about Augury and Pegasus.
Allison Butler
Actually, if I could, at least from the text, those are kind of Nolan's babies. So I'm going to turn that back over to him, if that's okay.
Nolan Higdon
Yeah, Pegasus is basically a piece of spy software that comes from the Israeli government. But Pegasus was basically put into other software. So if you went into other computers, basically, you could monitor people around the globe who had this Pegasus software on there, and it was basically creating a global surveillance platform. And Israel is hardly alone in this. The United States has been...
Chris Hedges
And I just want to interrupt Nolan, Pegasus is an Israeli creation. It comes out of Israel. It was used to track Jamal Khashoggi, I think.
Nolan Higdon
Right, yeah, and the US, like I said, is taking part in similar production and monitoring, including working with Israel on Pegasus. But, yeah, this, I think, to Allison's point about history has changed, we have to talk a lot about our expectations or what our rights and laws have to change as well. This idea of illegal searches and seizures or the idea that my privacy is something I own, those are changing in the digital era, and the law—and this is one of the things we advocate for in the text—the law needs to catch up with that, because a lot of the protections we had over privacy, loopholes have been exposed by governments and corporations, such as in the Pegasus example. We talk about things like, your first amendment protects freedom of speech from government, but government can work with tech companies to shut down certain speech or ideas, or you're protected in your communications, like privately in your home, but if it's email, that means you've given up those communications to a private company that can then give them to government. So there's a lot of these type of loopholes that they're exposing in the digital era, and that's one of the things we advocate for in the text, because we even had a student's rights movement that got students the right to privacy in schools. That's what created FERPA here in the United States. But then in around 2012, the Obama administration changed something to FERPA. And previously FERPA meant the school couldn't share a student's information with anybody. If they were underage, you could share it with their guardian. But the changes to FERPA in 2012 said, No, you can also share their information with educational partners. These are companies that have contracts with the schools. And so effectively, all of that data that the students rights movement worked to make sure was private was allowed to be distributed to these companies. And as we've seen, that's what allows it to get into other areas as well.
Chris Hedges
And talk about Augury. This is developed by a cybersecurity firm, team... What is it, Cymru, which makes massive amounts of data available for government and private customers. Various branches of the military have collectively paid $3.5 million to access Augury's data.
Nolan Higdon
Yeah, companies such as Augury, I like to think of them as sort of giant data broker repositories. So they go out and get access to massive amounts of data. They analyze this data in real time and the way the industry describes it, they sell basically products that analyze this data for companies or governments. But Augury is an example of something that serves the interests of governments who maybe want to target people or understand activist behavior or understand activist communication online. Augury promises to have this massive amount of data that it can analyze and provide some answers to questions that governments might have that are seeking to surveil, understand, predict or nudge behavior.
Chris Hedges
Allison you use a term in the book, "algorithmic racism." Can you explain that?
Allison Butler
So if we think about algorithms, and all of us are kind of, algorithms are sort of, I think our oxygen these days, right? Everything we do digitally is drawn from an algorithm. And algorithms feel, I think, to many, particularly when we're talking with students in K-12 and to some extent in higher education, they feel like this kind of mysterious thing that somehow in the computer... What we have to remember is that algorithms are, they're programs, they're coding, they're language, they're questions that are built by humans, so they are built with fallible humans' racism, sexism, homophobia, ableism, etc, right? So to our point of algorithmic racism is there is racism baked into these digital technologies, which means, from the get-go, they are going to see people of color, and by extension, women of color, people who have differing abilities, anybody who identifies as LGBTQ, basically anybody who is or identifies outside of what the creator of the algorithm sees as the norm, which means we're not necessarily looking at physical, tangible lived experiences of racism. We're looking at racism as a form of teaching us how to use digital technologies, because, as I said, it's sort of baked into this so the problems are coming to us right away. Therefore we start to learn how to manage things within that racist frame, and that becomes a norm, and it becomes sort of a centralized way of seeing it, which makes it significantly more dangerous for bodies of color, as well as for those who are interacting with bodies of color to have a preconceived notion built into their technologies of who these bodies are and how they're expected to behave.
Chris Hedges
Well, an example of that you pull from the book is facial recognition software in test proctoring software such as Proctorio, it's developed for white students. Black and brown students are less detectable and forced to provide more personal information than white students to confirm their identity. In another example of the racist bias coded into algorithms, research reveals that programs that promise to accurately predict student retention and course success falsely assume that students of color will not succeed. This is because massive amounts of data are needed to train algorithms and AI, but they are trained using inductive logic. So if they are programming to see multiple items but are only shown one result, the algorithm will communicate a variety of different things as only one thing. For example, if the algorithm is programmed to recognize apples but is only shown red apples, the code will see everything in that grouping as a red apple. While this is incorrect in the real world existence of apples, it is correct via what the algorithm was taught.
Allison Butler
The algorithm responds to human input, right? I mean, I think like in the 1980s, when we were sort of first kind of becoming familiar with computers, there was a little catch phrase, garbage, in garbage out that if you programmed, I mean, it wasn't just the regular people in our living rooms programming computers at that point, right? But if you programmed in garbage, then you got garbage. And I think we see this with our generative AI. Any one of us that stumble or struggle with ChatGPT, for example, maybe what we have to look at is what we're programming into it. It's the sophistication that is happening that this is not me kind of clunkily trying to figure out if ChatGPT can make me meal plans for the week so that I don't have to think that hard when I go to the grocery store. This is highly sophisticated programming that is then framing and constructing how the rest of us view the world, like our example of facial recognition software, and we have a very 21st century example of unearned privilege of being white. That white fits into the model much better.
Chris Hedges
Nolan, I want to talk about migrants. You write in the book, schools, especially universities in the US, the UK and Australia, are empowered and expected by lawmakers to identify migrant students with a contested or illegal immigration status. The US Department of Homeland Security maintains volumes of data for the purpose of locating and tracking migrants. For example, LexisNexis, which is used widely in education, sells data to the Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE. LexisNexis, a subsidiary of RELX corporation, offers data analytic products and online databases. It was found to have provided sensitive information to ICE, which ICE was presumably using to track and arrest individuals for deportation.
Nolan Higdon
Yeah, this came from the chapter that was motivated by the fact that every time we talk about this topic, we would always get this question, inevitably from someone who says Well, so what? I've got nothing to hide. Who cares about my privacy? And in the chapter you're reading from there, Chris, we tried to lay out a list of different vulnerabilities, and one in particular are students who have contested, or so called, illegal migrant status. They clearly have a reason to want privacy. It may not even be them, they may live with someone who has contested migrant status, who they want to protect through their own privacy as well, but by participating in the learning process where these tools are present, they threaten that migrant status of themselves or the people they live with, it could be used against them for deportation, arrest or anything else. And we see this over and over again. That's why we think these tools are so pernicious, because back to where we started this conversation, they're brought in for things like safety and improved learning and DEI and things I think most people would agree with, but in practice, they're used against those measures, criminalizing folks, monitoring them, and then using that information, possibly to deport someone.
Chris Hedges
You also highlight because school-issued devices can and do alert campuses to students' web searches, people who are searching about their sexuality and they've outed students' sexual preference. As a result, the LGBTQ+ students try to search for information about their sexuality or sexual curiosity, including health related questions, they risk having themselves outed to school officials, law enforcement and anyone else who can access their information.
Nolan Higdon
Yeah, this goes back to what we were saying, right? We believe education should be an exercise in freedom. Folks should be able to explore who they are, explore information. The expectation is they're going to make mistakes in the classroom as students, just our teachers, but they need to feel comfortable to be able to make those mistakes. When the idea is that you're constantly being monitored, or this could come back to your parents, or this could be broadcast the world, students are less likely to share. They're less likely to search out that information. It curtails curiosity, which is essential to the education process, and not to mention these folks are wrestling with critical questions about their identity, so the mental trauma and difficulty of closing one of the few spaces where they're able to explore, I think it just speaks to the problem with surveillance and the education process.
Chris Hedges
Allison, I want to talk about what this does within the schools and within the universities, you write that this constant surveillance is a way to ensure that faculty adhere to the ideological homogeneity sought by school leadership. It begins with the application process when candidates are required to share private details, such as their approaches to teaching and diversity statements, which are used to ensure ideological homogeneity on campus. It continues as students, often illegally, record what teachers do in the classroom. This can and has been used to pressure educators to leave their profession if they are perceived as holding an ideological position that runs counter to the status quo. We've watched this since October 7, repeatedly.
Allison Butler
I think that one of the things that these surveillance technologies can do, either intentionally or just by happenstance, is foment environments of mistrust, right? As Nolan has said, as I have said, as we say all the time in our classrooms, schooling classrooms, that's a place to make mistakes. It's a place to stumble. It's this place to be curious. It's a place where ignorance should be understood in a great way. I walk into a classroom as a student not knowing something. I am ignorant of it. I have the opportunity to learn from it. When we have an environment where we have all these divisions set up for us via technology, all of that runs the risk of disappearing, disappearing is too soft of a word, of being stomped out, right? I'm not saying that students should have or teachers should have their days filled with horrible, hateful talk, but I think we need to learn so many different perspectives in order to really be fully teaching and fully learning. And our digital technologies have the capability of recording, that's a thing that's important, but they also have the capability of manipulating, which changes the stories that teachers and students are telling. It creates classrooms that, at the very best, are going to run the risk of being boring, okay, but what we're really talking about is stifling learning. We're talking about stifling exposure. We're talking about stifling how to manage difference, right? I think, as we are looking at our global conflicts these days, particularly what's happening in Israel/Palestine is we are being taught lessons that say difference is bad versus difference is a way of starting to try and learn about each other as human beings. So when difference, when discussion, when question, when misunderstanding, genuine lack of understanding, is stifled by these digital technologies, our classrooms are no longer places of curiosity or inquiry. They're factories, just to give us a degree, and that degree might just not mean as much. Again, I'm not advocating in any way, shape or form, for a hate filled classroom, just to kind of like prove a point that things are different, but more about the fact that we should have environments where we get to be uncomfortable, curious, inquisitive, excited, all of the things as a tool of learning, and that we're doing that together in community, right? I think another big thing with these surveillance technologies, with, in particular, our social media technologies, is that they're incredibly isolating. They're, in fact, quite anti-social. And what school can do, what classrooms can do, what teaching and learning can do, is build collaboration and build community, which counters isolation. It counters that silofication and the surveillance technologies are working very hard to build isolation and to build silos.
Chris Hedges
Well, it shuts down any questioning of the dominant narrative, doesn't it?
Allison Butler
Absolutely, and students don't necessarily understand or know the structure of the dominant narrative. They don't necessarily know to question it. We've got to start talking about all of this stuff more, and that means being together in classrooms, in our world, being together in classrooms and removing, to the best that we can, these technologies.
Chris Hedges
Well, in any totalitarian system, the point is to deny the ability to ask the questions. Nolan, I want to ask, you said, there's a well documented history of employers utilizing surveillance to exploit workers and undermine collective bargaining. Rather than view EdTech surveillance as a benefit to the educational process or a safety measure, educators need to recognize that it can be used to data to undermine the power as an employee. Speak about that.
Nolan Higdon
Yeah, this was a really fascinating part of the book, and one that I know we've been trying to bring to faculty unions. But yeah, there's a long history of employers going back centuries, using physical spies or trying to spy on communication to figure out who's a labor agitator and remove them and anybody that sympathizes with them. This is a whole new era. We have these tools in the classroom which can surveil folks while they're working the classroom. Theoretically use things, either in context or out of context, to get rid of those employees. Also, we talked about Israel, Gaza, a lot of employees, faculty right now, they don't have protections. We've seen the adjunctification or at will of higher education. So regardless of how folks feel about that conflict, they avoid it in the classroom because they're afraid whatever they say can be used against them to lose their job, and that's not just them losing out, that's the students losing out an opportunity to engage about a critical world issue. And then moreso, as faculty, these tools are also trying to learn off what we're doing, so they're collecting our data and profiting from it without paying us. Generally the labor movement wants to get paid for labor. But furthermore, they're also training these tools to try and do some of the functions of what faculty are doing. So you're training your replacement at some level, and I'm thinking of things like smart grading and smart assignment writing, these new tools that are coming out. Or there's some where you can have a image of your face, and you can type and the image will lecture. That's a way to replace you as the lecture as well. So a lot of these things are coming down the pike, taking away privacy, replacing jobs, and faculty are actually participating in the process by using these tools and not getting strict barriers in their contracts to prevent this type of economic exploitation, not to mention this effort at surveillance to undermine the negotiation process.
Chris Hedges
Allison, if left unchecked, I know you end the book with suggestions on how to curb this intrusion into our privacy, but if left unchecked, what kind of an educational and even social and cultural environment are we going to live in?
Allison Butler
I think if left unchecked, we run the risk of living in factory schools, like I said before, that we just sort of push our students through on the way to picking up a piece of paper. We will train future generations that to be monitored is normal, that there is no such thing as privacy. We will have kind of rote types of education where very safe information and a safe way of presenting it, and we will, at least in terms of a digital language, know everything about everybody, with a possible caveat that those who fit into race, gender and economic and physical ability, quote, unquote, norms, will have it easier, but we will start to see all of our bodies that don't fit, all of our humans that don't necessarily fit into that, again, very generous, quote, unquote, norm, be moved further and further to the fringes. I think we could see that in a pretty short amount of time, our classrooms won't be thought of as places of curiosity, of inquisitiveness. They will be thought of as places of passively accepting very banal, careful information. At the same time, they're going to probably look pretty cool, because our surveillance technologies, all of our technologies, are very sophisticated looking. They are cutting edge. They are often hand me downs right? As Nolan mentioned before, so much of what we use comes to us from the military industrial complex that we can drive in unfamiliar places is GPS, is an outdated military technology. That we can take cool pictures of like parties or weddings or real estate is drone technology and outdated military technology. I think the content of our classroom runs the risk of being utterly banal and boring. The look of them could end up being pretty cool, which might be real flashy and invite us to forget to think about the content.
Chris Hedges
Well, when the government watches you 24 hours a day, you can't use the word liberty, that's the relationship between a master and a slave. That was Nolan Higdon and Allison Butler on their book, "Surveillance Education: Navigating the Conspicuous Absence of Privacy in Schools." That was really, really great work you both did. I want to thank Sofia [Menemenlis], Diego [Ramos] Thomas [Hedges] and Max [Jones], who produced the show. You can find me at ChrisHedges.Substack.com.
Photos
Monitoring through AI holographic eye - stock photo
AI holographic eye and data with network on a dark blue background.
STS-76
March 1996: The Sinai Peninsula and Nile Delta form a background to the Russian Space Station Mir, as viewed from the aft flight deck of the American shuttle Atlantis. The Atlantis docked with Mir for five days, during which time mission specialist Shannon W Lucid transferred to Mir as a guest researcher. (Photo by NASA/Space Frontiers/Getty Images)
A built-in car GPS system.
(Photo by Trevor Wrayton, VDOT)
Pro-Palestinian demonstrators hold a student- faculty rally at Dickson Plaza at an encampment on the UCLA campus...
Los Angeles, CA - April 29: Pro-Palestinian demonstrators hold a student- faculty rally at Dickson Plaza at an encampment on the UCLA campus on Monday, April 29, 2024 in Los Angeles, CA. (Brian van der Brug / Los Angeles Times via Getty Images)
Crowds wearing face masks to stop the spread of coronavirus...
MADRID, SPAIN - 2021/03/13: Crowds wearing face masks to stop the spread of coronavirus walk in downtown Madrid. According to the epidemiological report of covid-19 of the Community of Madrid, the new cases of coronavirus registered in Madrid have risen to 1,500, compared to 1,301 notified yesterday, and the deaths have also increased to 27 compared to 16 on Friday. (Photo by Marcos del Mazo/LightRocket via Getty Images)
March Against Trump's Immigration Policies Takes Place In Los Angeles
LOS ANGELES, CA - FEBRUARY 18: A Los Angeles police officer wear an AXON body camera during the Immigrants Make America Great March to protest actions being taken by the Trump administration on February 18, 2017 in Los Angeles, California. Protesters are calling for an end to stepped up ICE raids and deportations, and that health care be provided for documented and undocumented people. (Photo by David McNew/Getty Images)
An FBI agent has been charged with spying for Moscow for more than 15 years
385823 06: FBI agents remove evidence from the home of FBI agent Robert Philip Hanssen February 20, 2001 in Vienna, Va. Veteran FBI agent Robert Philip Hanssen has been charged with spying for Moscow for more than 15 years. He was arrested after allegedly dropping off a package of classified information for Russian agents. (Photo by Alex Wong/Newsmakers)
The Main Battle Staff Position at NORAD
The main battle staff position in the Combat Operations Center at Headquarters North American air Defense Command, Colorado Spring, Colo., fronts a display area which allows observers to see the positions of airborne objects thousands of miles away. NORAD's COC is hooked to all of NORAD's subordinate unites and to every major command post on the continent. From here an attack warning would be given to the air defense system, to Ottawa and Washington, and the Pentagon. Should North America ever be subjected to aerospace attack the battle would be monitored from the NORAD COC.
Dueling Rallies Held At George Washington University As Campus Protests Continue Nationwide
WASHINGTON, DC - MAY 02: George Washington University Police officers wrestle with pro-Palestinian demonstrators over control of a flag pole in front of Lisner Hall during a rally on May 02, 2024 in Washington, DC. Pro-Palestinian encampments have sprung up at college campuses around the country with some protestors calling for schools to divest from Israeli interests amid the ongoing war in Gaza. (Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)
TOPSHOT-US-PROTEST-FINANCE-OCCUPY WALL STREET
TOPSHOT - Members of Occupy Wall Street are arrested as they struggle with police during a celebration march after learning that they can stay on at Zuccotti Park in New York, October 14, 2011. Occupy Wall Street protesters and the New York Police Department avoided a potential clash as the real estate company that owns Zuccotti Park, where the protests began, decided to put off its planned cleaning of the square. Amid what was described as a celebratory march by a small group of protesters, scattered clashes with the police broke out, who bulked up their presence at the Zuccotti Park location, which has been home for hundreds of the protesters. AFP PHOTO/Emmanuel Dunand (Photo by EMMANUEL DUNAND / AFP) (Photo by EMMANUEL DUNAND/AFP via Getty Images)
TOPSHOT-US-PROTEST-FINANCE-OCCUPY WALL STREET
TOPSHOT - Mounted police stop Occupy Wall Street participants trying to break through police barricade set to stop them from taking their demonstration onto the street on Times Square in New York, October 15, 2011. As thousands of demonstrators protesting corporate greed filled Times Square, some 15 protestors were handcuffed and loaded into a police van following the confrontation with police. The Occupy Wall Street movement went global with groups from Asia to Europe, and in every US state, staging demonstrations and other actions. AFP PHOTO / Emmanuel Dunand (Photo by EMMANUEL DUNAND / AFP) (Photo by EMMANUEL DUNAND/AFP via Getty Images)
A computer screen inbox displaying unsol
A computer screen inbox displaying unsolicited emails known as "spam" in Hong Kong on March 20, 2009. The territory is under siege from legions of zombies attacking people with spam and leaving in their wake a trail of destruction costing millions of dollars a year, analysts have warned. AFP PHOTO/MIKE CLARKE (Photo credit should read MIKE CLARKE/AFP via Getty Images)
Migrants Attempt To Illegally Cross Mexican Border Into California
CALEXICO, CA - JUNE 15: Border patrol agents arrest a man trying to illegally enter the U.S. by floating down the New River, considered the nation?s most polluted waterway, in the early morning hours on June 15, 2006 in Calexico, California. Fears sparked by the arrival of US National Guard troops near Yuma, Arizona, to the east, have been blamed for skyrocketing fees charged by coyotes, guides who help people illegally cross the US-Mexico border. Fees that used to be a few hundred dollars now run in the thousands with no guarantee of success. Poor Central Americans are reportedly charged as much as $7000 per person. (Photo by David McNew/Getty Images)
Eager Class
An elementary school classroom full of children eagerly raising their hands to volunteer or answer a question, circa 1965. (Photo by L. Willinger/FPG/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
I'll Be Monitoring
A close-up of a human eye on an IBM computer monitor, 1983. (Photo by Alfred Gescheidt/Getty Images)
Before running for Congress to challenge the corruption of a leading corporate Democrat who played a key role in enabling the surveillance state, I worked for 15 years as a civil liberties advocate focused on building protections for First and Fourth Amendment rights that it has undermined. Thinking of mass surveillance as offending only privacy does a disservice to the further array of issues that are implicated, including freedom of association, freedom of conscience, and the capacity for meaningful democracy (which relies on the right to hear the opinions of vulnerable neighbors who silence themselves when aware that they are being monitored).
I wrote recently about those issues (at https://shahidbuttar.substack.com/i/151523320/democracy-mattersbut-it-means-more-than-democrats-think) and previously organized the Electronic Frontier Alliance, a national grassroots network among local organizations offering resources in their respective areas that include digital security trainings. https://efa.eff.org/
Another resource offered by my former colleagues at the Electronic Frontier Foundation is the Surveillance Self-Defense Guide. https://ssd.eff.org/ It presents a number of teaching tools that can be helpful for anyone looking for ways to insulate their communications, associations, or conscience from the threat of government omniscience.
When my kids were small and suffering from learning disabilities related to an autoimmune condition, I became-- at least for a time-- a proponent of cameras in classrooms. This was after each child came home with injuries from two different schools and both schools attempted to cover up what turned out to be violent and unjustified assaults by staff.
At the time, we pulled the kids from these schools on medical leave and homeschooled while attempting to file civil rights complaints. But-- hello Kafka-- it turned out the DOE OCR lawyers were former colleagues and drinking buddies of one of the school's sleazy attack dog attorneys. I found it even more Kafkaesque that, when we confronted the school attorney an OCR lawyers about this glaring conflict, they seemed so assured of their own power and our powerlessness that they didn't even bother to conceal the conflict. This had pretty predictable results: though our cases were well documented, backed by medical reports of injuries and both our children could clearly describe the unwarranted attacks, OCR-- after treating us with sneering contempt for more than a month-- dropped both cases on a lame technicality.
It was a horrifying, hope-and-happiness-killing, crushing experience, especially discovering that there's really no reliable legal recourse against abuse of disabled students. No legal authority in the state would step in and even the ACLU refused to take the cases citing lack of expertise in special education. Even private attorneys who'd fought valiantly for church sex abuse victims refused to meet with us for the same reason and special education attorneys would not work on contingency because, as several confessed, there's simply no way to win. On learning that the cost of even trying to fight the schools would be six figures + and the children might be adults by the time any of it resolved, we thought the funds would be better spent on trauma therapy and educational resources while the kids were still actually kids.
Partly as a way to deal with my own trauma over these events, I got involved with the very few activist collectives attempting to address the issue of school abuse of the disabled. I was radicalized in the process, especially when I learned that, since the late 90's, an estimated 1 to 3 disabled individuals-- mostly children-- died every week in schools and institutions due to dangerous disciplinary practices like restraint and seclusion.
Because there's been no attempt to curb these practices in the intervening years since the last assessment, one can only imagine that the body count has grown in the last three decades. Yet there's still no official central database tracking these deaths so it's anyone's guess how many disabled children are being injured and killed every year since. According to the GAO, most of these deaths occur due to disabled children being uncooperative or "disruptive," not-- as the Association of School Administrators repeatedly claims in defense of restraint and seclusion practices-- due to children being a danger to themselves or others. What's worse, according to other research, regional coroners will often collude with schools in student death cases and, exactly like Nazi-era doctors whitewashing the murders of child victims of the T4 program, reportedly often list these restraint or seclusion deaths as "cardiac insufficiency."
Anyway, this is why I and others once thought classroom surveillance might be the answer. But the devil is in the details and, the more specifics I learned about the incremental privatization of schools, the more I understood that the treatment of disabled children isn't precisely accidental but, in fact, systemic. According to reports collected by Diane Ravitch, in the current "testocracy" (by which private scholastic testing corporations profit off the taxpayer teat), since staff merit pay in public schools depends on student test curves and since 90% of disabled students will predictably fail or bring down the curves of these tests, it strongly suggests that individual schools and individual educators are highly incentivized to shuffle disabled students off to private institutional "disability gulags" (where the injury and death counts are statistically far higher) and deny these students constitutionally guaranteed free and appropriate public education.
Actually killing students via brutal and unnecessary "disciplinary" practices may be unintentional "overkill" so to speak, but there appears to be a general momentum towards discouraging families from demanding inclusive public education that can have predictable deadly outcomes.
All told, cameras in classrooms started looking more and more like putting cameras on the Titanic., including the predictable outcome that those with the most to hide would do everything they could to make video evidence inaccessible in order to avoid consequences and bad PR. According to Wrightslaw, this is what mostly happens when schools adopt classroom video surveillance policies. Though schools that adopt these policies are often happy to use video evidence to feed the school-to-prison pipeline, the same evidence has a way of getting lost when it shows institutional abuse of student rights and safety. Or else schools successfully argue to block public access to the evidence based on-- irony of ironies-- the "privacy rights" of students.
Before this gets too depressing... long story short, we ultimately decided to leave the country and educate our kids in a more humane political environment with a bonus free public health system. The kids are now accomplished and generally healthy bilingual art and music students. We invite their teachers to holiday parties and have grown very close to several. Since we got here, we never even had an impulse to demand video surveillance of the kids' classrooms because our gut instincts as parents were never rattled to that degree.
I mention the above because I hope those analyzing related issues might understand there are some of very ugly "protection racket" dynamics that influence regular Joe Americans to accept or even seek extreme surveillance in schools. Understanding these "devilish details" might help those trying to counter and argue against these surveillance policies.